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We study the extension of dependence logic D by a majority quantifier
M over finite structures. We show that the resulting logic is equi-expressive
with the extension of second-order logic by second-order majority quantifiers
of all arities. Our results imply that, from the point of view of descriptive
complexity theory, D(M) captures the complexity class counting hierarchy.
1 Introduction
We study the extension of dependence logic D by a majority quantifier M over finite
structures. Dependence logic [19] extends first-order logic by dependence atomic formu-
las
=(t1, . . . , tn)
the intuitive meaning of which is that the value of the term tn is completely deter-
mined by the values of t1, . . . , tn−1. While in first-order logic the order of quantifiers
solely determines the dependence relations between variables, in dependence logic more
general dependencies between variables can be expressed. Historically dependence logic
was preceded by partially ordered quantifiers (Henkin quantifiers) of Henkin [8] and
Independence-Friendly (IF) logic of Hintikka and Sandu [9]. It is known that both IF
logic and dependence logic are equivalent to existential second-order logic ESO in ex-
pressive power. From the point of view of descriptive complexity theory, this means that
dependence logic captures the class NP.
The framework of dependence logic has turned out be flexible to allow interesting
generalizations. For example, the extensions of dependence logic in terms of so-called
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intuitionistic implication and linear implication was introduced in [1]. In [23] it was
shown that extending D by the intuitionistic implication makes the logic equivalent to
full second-order logic SO.
Recently, new variants of the dependence atomic formulas have been introduced in [7]
and [6]. Also a modal version of dependence logic was introduced in [20] and has been
studied in [14] and [15]. In this paper we are concerned with introducing a new quantifier
to dependence logic: the majority quantifier. Adding majority and, more generally,
counting capabilities to logical formalisms or computational devices has deserved a lot
of attention in theoretical computer science. Understanding the power of counting is an
important problem both in logic and in computational complexity:
• The circuit class TC0, the class of problems solvable by polynomial-size constant-
depth circuits with majority gates, is at the current frontier for lower bound tech-
niques (see, e.g., [21]). We have strict separations of classes within TC0, but above
TC0 we have essentially no lower bounds. By a diagonalization it follows that TC0
is different from the second level of the exponential-time hierarchy, but a separa-
tion from a lower class seems to be far away. In particular, the question if TC0
equals NC1 (logarithmic-depth circuits with bounded fan-in gates) is considered
the P-NP problem of circuit complexity. (Concerning uniform circuits, we know
that uniform TC0 is strictly included in the class PP of probabilistic polynomial
time [2].)
• The counting-hierarchy (the oracle hierarchy built upon PP) can be characterized
using majority quantifiers in just the same way as by Wrathall’s theorem existential
and universal quantifiers characterize the polynomial hierarchy [17].
• By Toda’s theorem, one majority quantifier is as powerful as the whole polynomial
hierarchy [16].
Here we suggest a definition of a majority quantifier for dependence logic. The pro-
posed semantics mimics that of the existential and universal quantifiers in D. The
present paper is devoted to a first study of the resulting logic, denoted by D(M). We
examine some of its basic properties, prove strong normal forms (some of our technically
most involved proofs are found here), and show in our main result, that dependence
logic with the majority quantifier leads to a new descriptive complexity characterization
of the counting hierarchy: D(M) captures CH.
Engstro¨m [5] has also studied generalized quantifiers in dependence logic. He consid-
ered different conservative extensions of D—informally this means that he extends D by
generalized quantifiers in a first-order manner. From a descriptive complexity point of
view, his logics do not lead out of NP, i.e., ESO, assuming the quantifier in question
is ESO-definable (e.g., the majority quantifier). Our approach and results differ from
that of Engstro¨m since we are in a sense extending dependence logic by a dependence
majority quantifier, whose semantics is defined in close analogy with the semantics of ∃
and ∀ in dependence logic. The results of our paper show that our extension behaves
like an extension of SO by second-order generalized quantifiers.
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This article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we defined dependence logic and
discuss some basic results on it. Then we introduce a majority quantifier for the depen-
dence logic setting and discuss the basic properties of D(M). In subsection 2.3 we discuss
the complexity class counting hierarchy and the second-order majority quantifiers Mostk
that have been used to characterize it in [10]. In Section 3, we introduce second-order
majority quantifiers Mostkf ranging over functions and in Section 4 we show that, for
sentences the logics SO(Mostf) (the extension of second-order logic SO by Most
k
f for
k ≥ 1) and D(M) are equivalent.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we first define dependence logic and discuss its basic properties. Then we
define the counting hierarchy and the logic corresponding to it.
2.1 Dependence Logic
Dependence logic (D) extends the syntax of first-order logic by new dependence atomic
formulas. In this article we consider only formulas of D that are in negation normal
form.
Definition 2.1 ([19]). Let τ be a vocabulary. The τ -formulas of dependence logic (D[τ ])
is defined by extending FO[τ ], defined in terms of ∨, ∧, ¬, ∃ and ∀, by atomic dependence
formulas
=(t1, . . . , tn), (1)
where t1, . . . , tn are terms.
The meaning of the formula (1) is that the value of the term tn is functionally deter-
mined by the values of the terms t1, . . . , tn−1. The formula =() is interpreted as ⊤. The
semantics of D will be formally presented shortly.
Definition 2.2. Let φ ∈ D. The set Fr(φ) of free variables of a formula φ is defined as
for first-order logic, except that we have the new case
Fr(=(t1, . . . , tn)) = Var(t1) ∪ · · · ∪Var(tn),
where Var(ti) is the set of variables occurring in term ti. If Fr(φ) = ∅, we call φ a
sentence.
The semantics of D is formulated using the concept of a Team. Let A be a model with
domain A. Assignments of A are finite mappings from variables into A. The value of a
term t in an assignment s is denoted by tA〈s〉. If s is an assignment, x a variable, and
a ∈ A, then s(a/x) denotes the assignment (with domain dom(s)∪{x}) that agrees with
s everywhere except that it maps x to a.
Definition 2.3. Let A be a set and {x1, . . . , xk} a finite (possibly empty) set of variables.
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1. A team X of A with domain dom(X) = {x1, . . . , xk} (we call A the co-domain of
X) is any set of assignments s : {x1, . . . , xk} → A.
2. The relation rel(X) ⊆ Ak corresponding to X is defined as
rel(X) = {(s(x1), . . . , s(xk)) : s ∈ X}.
3. For a function F : X → A, we define
X(F/x) = {s(F (s)/x) : s ∈ X}
X(A/x) = {s(a/x) : s ∈ X and a ∈ A}.
We will next define the semantics of dependence logic. Below, atomic formulas and
their negations are called literals.
Definition 2.4 ([19]). Let A be a model and X a team of A. The satisfaction relation
A |=X φ is defined as follows:
1. If φ is a first-order literal, then A |=X φ iff for all s ∈ X we have A |=s φ.
2. A |=X=(t1, . . . , tn) iff for all s, s
′ ∈ X such that
tA1 〈s〉 = t
A
1 〈s
′〉, . . . , tAn−1〈s〉 = t
A
n−1〈s
′〉, we have tAn〈s〉 = t
A
n〈s
′〉.
3. A |=X ¬ =(t1, . . . , tn) iff X = ∅.
4. A |=X ψ ∧ φ iff A |=X ψ and A |=X φ.
5. A |=X ψ ∨ φ iff X = Y ∪ Z such that A |=Y ψ and A |=Z φ .
6. A |=X ∃xψ iff A |=X(F/x) ψ for some F : X → A.
7. A |=X ∀xψ iff A |=X(A/x) ψ.
Above, we assume that the domain of X contains the variables free in φ. Finally, a
sentence φ is true in a model A (in symbols: A |= φ) if A |={∅} φ. Above, A |=s φ
denotes satisfaction in first-order logic.
Let us then recall some basic properties of dependence logic that will be needed later.
The following lemma shows that the truth of a D-formula depends only on the inter-
pretations of variables occurring free in the formula. Below, for V ⊆ dom(X), X ↾ V is
defined by
X ↾ V := {s ↾ V | s ∈ X}.
Lemma 2.5 ([19]). Suppose V ⊇ Fr(φ). Then A |=X φ if and only if A |=X↾V φ.
All formulas of dependence logic also satisfy the following strong monotonicity prop-
erty called Downward Closure.
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Proposition 2.6 ([19]). Let φ be a formula of dependence logic, A a model, and Y ⊆ X
teams. Then A |=X φ implies A |=Y φ.
On the other hand, the expressive power of sentences of D coincides with that of
existential second-order sentences:
Theorem 2.7 ([19]). D = ESO.
Finally, we note that dependence logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic.
Definition 2.8. A formula φ of D is called a first-order formula if it does not contain
dependence atomic formulas as subformulas.
First-order formulas of dependence logic satisfy the so-called flatness property:
Theorem 2.9 ([19]). Let φ be a first-order formula of dependence logic. Then for all A
and X:
A |=X φ if and only if for all s ∈ X we have A |=s φ.
2.2 Dependence logic with a majority quantifier
The main topic of the present paper is the study of a logic obtained from D by the
introduction of a majority quantifier M. We denote this extended logic by D(M). It
is formally defined by extending the syntax and semantics of dependence logic by the
following clause:
A |=X Mxφ(x) iff for at least |A|
|X|/2 many functions F : X → A we have
A |=X(F/x) φ(x).
Analogously to D the logic D(M) has the so-called empty team property:
Proposition 2.10. For all models A and formulas φ of D(M), it holds that A |=∅ φ.
Proof. The claim is proved using induction on φ.
We also observe thatD(M) satisfies the downward closure property (compare to Propo-
sition 2.6).
Proposition 2.11. Let φ be a formula of D(M), A a model, and Y ⊆ X teams. Then
A |=X φ implies A |=Y φ.
Proof. The claim is proved using induction on φ. We consider the case where φ is Mxψ.
The other cases are proved exactly as for dependence logic (see Proposition 3.10 in [19]).
By the induction assumption, ψ satisfies the claim. Let A, X and Y be as above and
suppose that |A| = n, |X| = m, and |Y | = m − 1. Let us assume A |=X φ. Then for
at least (nm)/2 many functions F : X → A it holds that A |=X(F/x) ψ. Since ψ satisfies
the claim, it holds that if A |=X(F/x) ψ, then A |=Y (F ′/x) ψ, where
F ′ = F ↾ Y. (2)
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Note that, in the worst case, at most n different functions F gives rise to the same
reduct F ′ in (2). Therefore, the number of functions F : Y → A satisfying A |=Y (F/x) ψ
is at least (nm)/2n = nm−1/2 and hence A |=Y φ. It is easy to see that the analogous
argument can be used with any Y ⊆ X.
A well-studied property in the context of dependence logic is that of coherence, defined
as follows. A formula φ is called k-coherent if and only if for all structures A and teams
X it holds that
A |=X φ⇔ for every k-element subteam X
′ ⊆ X it holds that A |=X′ φ.
1-coherent formulas are also called flat.
Proposition 2.12. There is a formula φ ∈ D(M) without dependence atoms such that
φ is not k-coherent for any k ∈ N.
We also note that the analogue of Proposition 2.5 does not hold for D(M).
Proposition 2.13. The truth of a D(M)-formula φ may depend on the interpretations
of variables that do not occur free in φ.
Due to space restrictions, the proofs of Propositions 2.12 and 2.13 are deferred to the
appendix.
2.3 Second-order Majority Quantifiers and the Counting Hierarchy
In this section we define the counting hierarchy and the relevant generalized quantifiers.
Definition 2.14. Let k ≥ 1. We define the k-ary second-order generalized quantifier
Most
k binding a k-ary relation symbol X in a formula φ. Assume A is a structure with
domain A such that |A| = n. Then the semantics of this quantifier is defined as follows:
A |= MostkXφ(X) ⇐⇒
∣∣{B ⊆ Ak | A |= φ(B)
}∣∣ ≥ 2nk/2.
We will also make use of the so-called k-ary second-order Rescher quantifier, defined as
follows:
A |= RkX,Y (φ(X), ψ(Y )) ⇐⇒
∣∣{B ⊆ Ak | A |= φ(B)
}∣∣ ≥
∣∣{B ⊆ Ak | A |= ψ(B)
}∣∣.
It is quite easy to see that theMostk-quantifier can be defined in terms of the quantifier
R
k. In [10] it was shown that the k-ary Rescher quantifier Rk can be defined in first
order logic with Mostk+1, and, for k ≥ 2, already with Mostk. It is worth noting
that in [10] the quantifiers Mostk and Rk are interpreted as strict majority and strict
inequality, respectively. All the results of [10] that we use also hold under the ”non-strict”
interpretation adopted in this article.
The counting hierarchy (CH) is the analogue of the polynomial hierarchy, defined as
the oracle hierarchy using as building block probabilistic polynomial time (the class PP)
instead of NP:
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1. C0P = P,
2. Ck+1P = PP
CkP,
3. CH =
⋃
k∈NCkP.
The counting hierarchy was first defined by Wagner [22] but the above equivalent for-
mulation is due to Tora´n [17]. The class PP consists of languages L for which there is a
polynomial time-bounded nondeterministic Turing machine N such that, for all inputs
x, x ∈ L iff more than half of the computations of N on input x accept.
In [10] it was shown that the extension FO(Most) of FO by the quantifiers Mostk,
for k ∈ N, describes exactly the problems in the counting hierarchy. The proof therein
used the fact that the second-order existential quantifier can be simulated by Mostk and
first-order logic.
Theorem 2.15. FO(Most) = SO(Most) = CH.
By the above remark we see that in the previous theorem the Most quantifiers can be
replaced by Rescher quantifiers.
3 Majority over Functions
For our main result that compares second-order logic and dependence logic with majority-
quantifiers, it turns out to be helpful to consider a version of the Most-quantifier that
ranges over functions instead of relations.
Definition 3.1. Let k ≥ 1. We define the k-ary second-order generalized quantifier
Most
k
f binding a k-ary function symbol g in a formula φ. Assume A is a structure with
domain A such that |A| = n. Then
A |= Mostkf g φ(g) ⇐⇒
∣∣{f : Ak → A | A |= φ(f)
}∣∣ ≥ nnk/2.
We denote by SO(Mostf) the extension of SO by the quantifiers Most
k
f for all k ≥ 1.
The following elementary properties of SO(Mostf) will be useful.
Proposition 3.2. The following equivalences hold:
1. (φ ∨Mostkf g ψ) ≡ Most
k
f g (φ ∨ ψ), if g does not appear free in φ,
2. (φ ∧Mostkf g ψ) ≡ Most
k
f g (φ ∧ ψ), if g does not appear free in φ.
The equivalences of Proposition 3.2 obviously hold also for the relational majority
quantifiers Mostk.
The next proposition states the intuitively obvious fact that the extensions of SO by
the quantifiers Mostk or alternatively by Mostkf , for k ∈ N, are equal in expressive power.
Proposition 3.3. SO(Most) = SO(Mostf).
7
Proof. We prove the claim by an argument analogous to Theorem 3.4 in [10]. We will
show how to express the quantifier Mostkf in the logic SO(Most) implying SO(Mostf) ≤
SO(Most). The converse inclusion is proved analogously.
Let us consider a formula of the form Mostkf gφ(g) ∈ SO(Mostf). Let A be a structure.
We may assume that A is ordered (we can existentially quantify it) and hence there
is a FO-formula δ(x, y) defining the lexicographic ordering of the set Ak+1. We can
construct a formula χ(X,Y ) which, for A1, A2 ⊆ A
k+1, defines the lexicographic ordering
(A1 ≤l A2) of k + 1-ary relations induced by δ(x, y).
It is now fairly straightforward to express Mostkf gφ(g) in the logic SO(Most). Let
G = {B ⊆ Ak+1 | B is the graph of some g and A |= φ(g)},
Gc = {B ⊆ Ak+1 | B is the graph of some g and A 6|= φ(g)}.
It now suffices to express |G| ≥ |Gc| in the logic SO(Most). For a D ⊆ Ak+1, define the
set IS(D) (the “initial segment” determined by D) by
IS(D) = {D′ ⊆ Ak+1| D′ /∈ G ∪Gc and D′ ≤l D}.
The condition |G| ≥ |Gc| can be now expressed by
∀D
(
|Gc ∪ IS(D)| ≥ 2n
k+1
/2⇒ |G ∪ IS(D)| ≥ 2n
k+1
/2
)
.
It is straightforward to express this in the logic SO(Most).
The following lemma will be needed in the proof of the next proposition.
Lemma 3.4. Let k ≥ 1. There exists an ESO sentence χ(g), where g is k-ary, such
that for all A with domain |A| = n, χ(g) is satisfied by exactly ⌈nn
k
/2⌉ − 2n
k−1 many
k-ary functions g none of which is a characteristic function of some k-ary relation, i.e.,
g(a) /∈ {0, 1} for some a ∈ Ak and distinct elements 0 and 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that A = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} and that ≤
is the canonical ordering of A. Let us first consider the case that |A| = n is even. Let
ϕ(U), where U is a unary relation symbol, be the sentence
∀x(U(0) ∧ (U(x)↔ ¬U(x+ 1))). (3)
Note that there is a natural bijection between functions g such that g(0) ∈ U and
functions h satisfying h(0) 6∈ U , namely, if f : A → A is such that f(a) = a + 1 if a is
even and f(a) = a− 1 otherwise, then
F : g 7→ f ◦ g,
is such a bijection of k-ary functions of A.
Then, we set χ′(g) ≡ ∃U(ϕ(U) ∧ U(g(0)) ∧ ∃x g(x) /∈ {0, 1}). The last conjunct
eliminates functions that correspond to a characteristic function of some k-ary relation.
8
Over structures with domain of even cardinality, the sentence χ′(g) satisfies the claim of
the lemma.
Suppose now that |A| = n > 2 is odd. Let c = n − 1, i.e., a definable constant from
the linear order. Define ϕ′(U) as follows:
∀x(U(0) ∧ ¬U(c) ∧ (x < c− 1→ (U(x)↔ ¬U(x+ 1))).
Let ψ(g, U) be the following formula:
ψ(g, U) ≡ (∃x U(g(x)) ∧ ∀y < x g(y) = c) ∨ (∀x g(x) = c).
We then set χ′′(g) = ∃U(ϕ′(U) ∧ ψ(g, U) ∧ ∃x g(x) /∈ {0, 1}). The proof that χ′′(g)
realizes a suitable partition of k-ary functions can be explain algorithmically as follows.
Formula ϕ′(U) splits the domain into three parts, one containing c only, one containing
elements of U and the rest (of size equal to that of U). Functions g are then sorted
according to whether the first element whose image under g is not c has its image in U
or not. At each step t, t ≥ 0, an equal number of function are accepted and rejected and
we postpone the decision about functions g such that g(t) = c to the next steps. At the
end, only the constant function g(x) = c, for all x < n remain. It is put explicitly into
the ”good” side by the second disjunct of formula ψ(g, U). Note that we are taking half
of the k-ary functions which are not characteristic functions of k-ary relations hence half
of the number:
nn
k
− 2n
k
that is ⌈nn
k
/2⌉ − 2n
k−1.
The expected formula is now χ(g) ≡ (χ′(g)∧ θeven)∨ (χ
′′(g)∧ θodd), where θeven (respec-
tively θodd) is a ESO-sentence expressing that |A| is even (respectively odd).
The next proposition gives a useful normal form for sentences of the logic SO(Mostf).
Proposition 3.5. Every sentence of SO(Mostf) is equivalent to a sentence of the form
∃h
1
Most
k
f g1 · · ·Most
k
f gl ∃h
2
θ,
where the function symbols in h
1
, and gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, are k-ary (k ≥ 3), and θ is a
universal first-order sentence.
Proof. Note that by Proposition 3.3 it suffices to show that every sentence of the logic
SO(Most) can be transformed to this form. The result in [10] shows (as pointed out in
Lemma 10.5 in [11]) that, in the presence of built-in relations {<,+,×}, sentences of
SO(Most) can be assumed to have the form
Most
i1Y1 · · ·Most
ilYl ψ, (4)
where ψ is first-order. Furthermore, when l in (4) is fixed, we get a fragment of SO(Most)
characterizing the lth level of CH, i. e., the class ClP.
We will next show how to transform any sentence of the form (4) to the required form.
The first step is to quantify out the built-in relations {<,+,×} to get a sentence of the
form
∃X<∃X+∃X×Most
i1Y1 · · ·Most
ilYl ψ
∗. (5)
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The relations X<, X+, and X× can be axiomatized as part of ψ
∗ (compare to case 2
of Proposition 3.2). Then we modify the sentence (5) to change the arities of all the
quantified relations to some big enough k. We need only to replace all occurrences, say
Yi(t1, . . . , tij ), of the quantified relation symbols in ψ
∗ by Yi(t1, . . . , tij , 0, . . . , 0). (Note
that the needed constant 0 can be defined using the linear order.) Increasing the arity of
the second-order existential quantifiers in (5) is clearly unproblematic. For the majority
quantifiers Mostij , we note that for any structure A of cardinality n and B ⊆ Av, the
number of k-ary relations D ⊆ Ak such that
{a ∈ Av | (a, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ D} = B (6)
is 2n
k−nv , which is independent of B. Furthermore, obviously the truth of ψ∗ with respect
to a tuple of k-ary relations D1, . . . ,Dl+3 only depends on whether ψ
∗(B1, . . . , Bl+3)
holds, where Bi is the restriction of Di defined analogously to (6). This fact allows us to
increase also the arity of the majority quantifiers without changing the meaning of the
sentence (5).
Let us then show how to transform the relational quantifiers in (5) into function
quantifiers. We claim that it is possible to replace ψ∗(X<,X+,X×, Y1, . . . , Yl) by a
formula of the form
θ(g) ∨ (∀x(
∧
1≤i≤l
gi(x) ∈ {0, 1}) ∧ ψ
′(g</X<, g+/X+, g×/X×, g1/Y1, . . . , gl/Yl)), (7)
where g = (g<, g+, g×, g1, . . . , gl), the new function symbols are all k-ary and ψ
′ is ob-
tained from ψ∗ by substituting subformulas Z(t1, . . . , tk) by the corresponding g(.)(11, . . . , tk) =
1, where Z ∈ {Y1, . . . , Yl,X<,X+,X×}.
The formula θ(g) is a ESO-formula that accepts certain dummy functions in order to
shift the border of acceptance from (2|A|
k
)/2 (half of k-ary relations) to |A||A|
k
/2 (half
of k-ary functions). The logical form of θ is
χ(g1) ∨ χ(g2) ∨ · · · ∨ χ(gl),
where χ(g) is defined in Lemma 3.4. Note that we repeatedly use case 1 of Lemma 3.2
to gather all the formulas χ(gi) into θ which is placed after the block of all majority
quantifiers.
To prove the claim we finally transform the formula (7) into Skolem normal form to
get a sentence of the form
∃g<∃g+∃g×Most
k
f g1 · · ·Most
k
f gl ∃gψ
′, (8)
where ψ′ is a universal FO-sentence.
4 SO(Most) = D(M)
In this section we show that the logics SO(Mostf) (and thus, by the previous section,
SO(Most)) and D(M) are equivalent with respect to sentences.
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We will first show a compositional translation mapping formulas of D(M) into sen-
tences of SO(Mostf). This translation is analogous to the translation from D into ESO
of [19].
Lemma 4.1. Let τ be a vocabulary. For every D(M)[τ ]-formula φ there is a τ ∪ {S}-
sentence ψ of SO(Mostf) such that for all models A and teams X with dom(X) = Fr(φ)
it holds that
A |=X φ ⇐⇒ (A, rel(X)) |= ψ.
Proof. For technical reasons to be motived shortly, we will actually prove a slightly more
general result showing that for every D(M)[τ ]-formula φ and every finite set of variables
{y1, . . . , yn} ⊇ Fr(φ) there is a SO(Mostf)[τ ∪S]-sentence ψ such that for all A and teams
X with dom(X) = {y1, . . . , yn} it holds that
A |=X φ ⇐⇒ (A, rel(X)) |= ψ.
We will prove the claim using induction on the structure of D(M)-formulas. In the
following we write φ(y1, . . . , yn) to mean that Fr(φ) ⊆ {y1, . . . , yn}. The quantifiers R
k
can be uniformly defined in the logic SO(Most), hence by the results of the previous
section, also in SO(Mostf). Therefore, we may freely use the quantifiers R
k in the
translation.
Atomic formulas and their negations are translated exactly in the same way as in the
analogous translation from D into ESO in [19]. The cases γ := ∃ynφ(y1, . . . , yn) and γ :=
∀ynφ(y1, . . . , yn) are also translated as in [19]. Suppose then that γ := (φ∨ψ)(y1, . . . , yn)
and that φ∗(S) and ψ∗(S) already exist by induction hypothesis. We translate γ as
follows:
γ∗(S) := ∃Y ∃Z(φ∗(Y/S) ∧ ψ∗(Z/S) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn(S(y)→ R(y) ∨ T (y))). (9)
Note that γ∗(S) is defined as in [19]. The only difference is that in the case of dependence
logic the sentence (9) can be written using a single sentence φ∗(S) (and ψ∗(S)) that
translates φ over teams with domain Fr(φ) (see Proposition 2.5). In the case of D(M)
the behavior of φ and ψ over teams X with dom(X) = {y1, . . . , yn} does not in general
reduce to their behavior over X ↾ Fr(φ) and X ↾ Fr(ψ) (see Proposition 2.13). Therefore,
to formulate the sentence (9), we need sentences φ∗(S) and ψ∗(S) that are correct
translations of φ and ψ with respect to teams with domain {y1, . . . , yn}.
The case γ := (φ ∧ ψ)(y1, . . . , yn) is also analogous to [19]. It remains to consider the
case where our formula γ is of the form
γ := Mynφ(y1, . . . , yn) (10)
and φ is a formula for which we have already a translation into an SO(Mostf)[τ ∪ S]
sentence φ∗(S). We claim that γ can be translated as follows:
γ∗(S) := Rn Y,Z(θ1(Y ), θ2(Z)) (11)
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where
θ1(Y ) := φ
∗(Y/S) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn−1∃
=1ynY (y) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn−1(∃ynY (y)↔ S(y1, . . . , yn−1))
θ2(Z) := ¬φ
∗(Z/S) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn−1∃
=1ynZ(y) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn−1(∃ynZ(y)↔ S(y1, . . . , yn−1)).
The following equivalence is now obvious for all A and X:
A |=X γ ⇔ (A, rel(X)) |= γ
∗(S).
Next we will show that, for sentences, Lemma 4.1 can be reversed.
Lemma 4.2. Let τ be a vocabulary and φ ∈ SO(Mostf)[τ ]. Then there is a sentence
ψ ∈ D(M)[τ ] such that for all models A:
A |= φ ⇐⇒ A |= ψ.
Proof. By Proposition 3.5 we may assume that φ is of the form:
∃h
1
Most
k
f g1 · · ·Most
k
f gn ∃h
2
∀x1 · · · ∀xmψ, (12)
where the function symbols in h
1
and g1, . . . , gn are k-ary, and ψ is quantifier free. Before
translating this sentence into D(M), we will first apply certain reductions to it. First of
all, we make sure that the functions gi have only occurrences of the form gi(x1, . . . , xk)
in ψ. We can achieve this by existentially quantifying new names fi for these symbols
and passing on to the sentence
∃h
1
Most
k
f g1 · · ·Most
k
f gn ∃h
2
∃f1 · · · ∃fn∀x1 · · · ∀xm(
∧
1≤j≤n
gj(x1, . . . , xk) = fj(x1, . . . , xk)∧ψ
∗),
(13)
where ψ∗ is obtained from ψ by replacing all occurrences of gi by fi for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Analogously, we may also assume that the functions h in h
1
have only occurrences
h(x1, . . . , xk) in ψ. Here m can always be made at least k.
The next step is to transform the quantifier-free part ψ∗ to satisfy the condition that
for each of the function symbols h in h
2
(also fi) there is a unique tuple x of pairwise
distinct variables such that all occurrences of it in ψ∗ are of the form h(x) (fi(x)). In
order to achieve this, we might have to introduce new existentially quantified functions
and also universal first-order quantifiers (see Theorem 6.15 in [19]), but the quantifier
structure of the sentence (12) does not change.
We will now assume that the sentence (12) has the properties discussed above:
1. The function symbols h ∈ h
1
and gi have only occurrences of the form h(x1, . . . , xk)
and gi(x1, . . . , xk) in ψ, respectively.
2. For each h in h
2
(fi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) there is a unique tuple x of pairwise distinct
variables such that all occurrences of h in ψ∗ are of the form h(x) (fi(x)).
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We will now show how the sentence (12) can be translated into D(M). For the sake of
bookkeeping, we assume that h
1
= h1 . . . hp, h
2
= hp+1 . . . hr, and that hi appears in ψ
only as hi(x
i). We claim now that the following sentence of D(M) is a correct translation
for (12):
∀x1 · · · ∀xk∃y1 · · · ∃ypMz1 · · ·Mzn∀xk+1 · · · ∀xm∃yp+1 · · · ∃yr(
∧
p+1≤j≤r
=(xi, yi)∧ θ), (14)
where θ is obtained from ψ by replacing all occurrences of the term gi(x1, . . . , xk) by the
variable zi and, similarly, each occurrence of hi(x
i) by yi.
Let us then show that the sentence φ (see (12)) and sentence (14) are logically equiva-
lent. Let A be a structure and let h1, . . . ,hr and g1, . . . ,gn interpret the corresponding
function symbols. We will show that the following holds:
(A,h,g) |=X ψ ⇔ A |=X∗ θ, (15)
where X = {∅}(A/x1) · · · (A/xm) and
X∗ = {∅}(A/x1) · · · (A/xk)(H1/y1) · · · (Hp/yp)(G1/z1) · · · (Gn/zn)(A/xk+1) · · · (A/xm)
(Hp+1/y1) · · · (Hr/yr),
where the supplement functions Hi and Gi are defined using the functions hi and gi as
follows:
Hi(s) = hi(s(x1), . . . , s(xk)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ p,
Hi(s) = hi(s(x
i)) for p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
Gi(s) = gi(s(x1), . . . , s(xk)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and where s(xi) is the tuple obtained by pointwise application of s. The claim in
(15) is now proved using induction on the structure of the quantifier-free formula ψ.
Note that ψ is a first-order formula of dependence logic; hence, by Theorem 2.9, (15)
holds iff the equivalence holds for each s ∈ X (equivalently s ∈ X∗ since the values
of the universally quantified variables functionally determine the values of all the other
variables) individually. We can now show, using induction on the construction of ψ, that
for all s ∈ X∗ it holds that
A |=s θ ⇐⇒ (A,h,g) |=s′ ψ, (16)
where s′ = s ↾ {x1, . . . , xm}. The key to this result is the fact that, for every s, the
interpretation of the variables zi and yi agree with the interpretation of the terms hi(x
i)
and g(x1, . . . , xk), respectively.
Finally, we note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between all possible inter-
pretations h1, . . . ,hr and g1, . . . ,gn for the function symbols and teams X
∗ satisfying the
dependence atomic formulas in (14). Therefore, sentence φ (see (12)) and sentence (14)
are logically equivalent.
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5 Conclusion and Open Questions
We have seen that extending dependence logic by a majority quantifier increases the
expressive power of dependence logic considerably. One particular consequence of our
result is that D(M) is closed under classical negation on the level of sentences. Note
further that, for open formulas, this does not hold because of the downward closure
property of formulas.
Several open questions remain and we now discuss some of them. Firstly, Proposition
2.12 shows that the fragment of D(M) without dependence atoms does not satisfy the
flatness property. It would be interesting to pin down the exact expressive power of
sentences of D(M) without dependence atoms.
The second open question concerns the open formulas of D(M). In [12] it was shown
that the open formulas of D correspond to the downwards monotone properties of NP
(see [12] for the exact formulation). We conjecture that the open formulas of D(M)
correspond in an analogous manner to the downwards monotone properties of CH.
The majority quantifier is only one particular example of so-called generalized quanti-
fiers (or, Lindstro¨m quantifiers), introduced in [13] and studied extensively in the context
of descriptive complexity theory (see surveys [18] and [4]). In [3], second-order Lind-
stro¨m quantifiers were introduced and some results concerning their expressive power
were obtained. We consider it an interesting study to enrich in a similar way dependence
logic by further generalized quantifiers and relate the obtained logics to those studied in
[3].
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.12. At first we give a counterexample to the flatness property,
i.e., we will give an example such that φ := Mx3 x2 6= x3 does not hold on a team with
at least two assignments but it does hold on every unary subset of this team.
Let A be any structure with domain A := {0, 1, 2} and the team X be defined as in
Table 1.
x1 x2
s1 0 0
Table 1: The team X
x1 x2
s1 0 0
s2 1 0
Table 2: The team Y
x1 x2
s1 0 0
s2 1 0
s3 2 0
Table 3: The team Z
x1 x2
s1 0 0
s2 1 0
...
...
...
sk+1 n 0
Table 4: The team X showing that φ is not
k-coherent
The number of functions F : |X| → |A| is 31 = 3. Let A′ := {1, 2}, then every function
F ′ : X → A′ satisfies A |=X(F ′/x3) x2 6= x3. From |A
′||X| = 2 we have A |=X φ.
Let us now consider team Y depicted in Table 2. By an analogous argument, formula
φ holds in all one element subteams X of Y . However, among the 32 = 9 possible
ways of supplementing Y , there are |A′||X| = 4 many functions F ′ : X → A′ such that
A |=Y (F/x3) x2 6= x3. Thus, A 6|=Y φ. Since the assignments of Y agree on the variables
considered in φ, we may assume, that X represents every subteam of Y .
Furthermore, if we consider Table 2 over a structure A with a domain of size 4 (here
A := {0, 1, 2, 3}, A′ := {1, 2, 3}) we have, that |A||Y | = 42 = 16. Again have |A′||Y | =
32 = 6 many functions F ′ : X → A′ such that A |=X(F ′/x3) x2 6= x3. Since there are
|A||X| = 9 many supplementing function we have A |=Y φ.
But if we construct the team Z by adding to Y one more assignment as depicted in
Table 3, we have that |A||X| = 43 = 64 but the number of functions G : A → X with
A |=Z(G/x3) x2 6= x3 then is 3
3 = 27 which is less than 32. Hence, A 6|=Z φ.
We can generalize this observation showing, that φ is not k-coherent by the following
construction. Let X be a team of assignments {s1, . . . , sk, sk+1}, where si(x1) := i and
si(x2) := 0 and A be a structure such that m = k + 2 := |A|. Let φ := Mx3 x2 6= x3.
Then there are (m − 1)k+1 functions F : X → A which satisfy x2 6= x3. And from
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(m− 1)k+1 ≤ m
k+1
2 we conclude that that A 6|=X φ.
However, for every k-element subteam X ′ of X we have (m − 1)k many functions
satisfying x2 6= x3 and by (m− 1)
k > m
k
2 if follows that A |=X′ φ.
Note that the team has domain {x1, x2} and we have one fixed formula φ = Mx3 x2 6=
x3 that is not k-coherent for every k. Only the structure and the team varies as depicted
in Table 4.
Proof of Proposition 2.13. We give a counterexample to the analogue of Proposition 2.5
for D(M). Recall that, for a team X and V ⊆ dom(X), X ↾ V denotes
X ↾ V := {s ↾ V | s ∈ X}.
Proposition 2.5 shows that
A |=X φ if and only if A |=X↾V φ, (17)
for all φ ∈ D, all structures A, teams X, and V ⊇ Fr(φ). It turns out that the left-to-
right implication in (17) remains true also for formulas of D(M). This can be proved
using induction on φ ∈ D(M) with the help of the fact that all formulas of D(M) satisfy
the downward closure property of Proposition 2.11.
We will give a counterexample for the right-to-left implication. Let A = {0, 1, 2} and
Z be as defined in Table 3 above. Suppose also that V = {x2}, and φ := Mx3 =(x3).
Now the team Z ↾ V contains only one assignment s and s(x2) = 0. Hence trivially
A |=Z↾V (F/x3)=(x3) for all F : Z ↾ V → A, and therefore
A |=Z↾V Mx3 =(x3).
On the other hand, A |=Z(F/x3)=(x3) holds for three (out of nine possible) functions
F : Z → A only, hence
A 6|=Z Mx3 =(x3).
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